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ABSTRACT
Evil-twin is a common attack in WIFI environments, with
which an attacker can set up a fake AP to steal sensitive
information from the connected devices. The current ap-
proaches of detecting Evil-twin AP use some identities or
fingerprints (such as SSIDs, MAC address and network traf-
fic patterns) to verify the identify of the AP. However, such
information can be easily obtained and faked by the attack-
er, leading to low detection rates.
This paper presents a novel Evil-Twin AP detection method
based on the received signal strength indicator (RSSI). Our
key insight is that the AP location rarely moves in a smart
home environment where the RSSI of the genuine AP is
relatively stable. Therefore, the RSSI can be used as the
fingerprint of the genuine AP to detect fake APs. Our ap-
proach employs two strategies to detect a fake AP in two
different scenarios where the genuine AP can be located on
a single or multiple locations. Our approach uses the mul-
tipath effect of the WIFI signal to detect the identify of
the connected AP. Compared to classical detection methods,
our approach does not rely professional devices. Experimen-
tal results show that the single position detection approach
achieves with an accuracy over 90% with little cost in delay
time.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Have you imaged that one day someone would open your
intelligent door when you are outside, turn on your gas valve
when you are sleeping and steal your bank count when you
are surfing on the Internet? After the traditional internet
and intelligent transportation internet, the attacker can put
his claws to the Smart Homes Internet[1],It is not an exag-
geration to say that these attacks are invading every corner
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of our lives with the rapid development of wireless commu-
nication technology, such as WIFI, 4G, GPS etc[2, 3].One
of the most commonly attacks in the WIFI environment is
referred to as the Evil Twin Attack which occurs when an
adversary clones an AP with the same identity (or SSID)
as an authentic AP.The bogus AP then exploits automatic
access point selection techniques to trick a wireless client to
connect to itself. Such fake APs are also known as Evil-Twin
AP (Rouge AP or Fake AP)[4].An adversary can use an Evil-
Twin AP as a platform to launch a variety of attacks, such
as privacy and data theft. It is easily for the rogue AP to ob-
tain information from the WIFI environment to compromise
the security of the user. Smart Homes that rely on WIFI
are also indispensable for suffering from Evil Twin Attacks.
For instance, the Evil-Twin AP can hijack the DNS proto-
col and redirect the clients to a malicious server to steal the
password of fingerprint lock or turning on the gas valve.
Because of the serious consequence, Evil-Twin AP detec-
tion has recently received much attention[5, 6].There are two
widely used approaches in this domain. One is extracting u-
nique traffic characteristics from the network flow[7, 8]. For
example, to distinguish authorized WLAN hosts from unau-
thorized WLAN hosts connected to rogue access points by
analyzing traffic characteristics, such as packet arrival time,
request/response time of continuous ACK in TCP traffic.
These methods are affected by the network’s type, band-
width and congestion. Purely relying on network traffics can
result in poor detection performance because the detection
algorithms can miss some rouge APs with high impercepti-
bility. The other approach, namely fingerprint identification
detection methods, uses hard-ware features[9–16],to differ-
ent the rogue APs from authentic APs. This is achieved
by collecting key information of the authentic APs, such as
firmware, chip, driver etc. Such an approach relies on the
assumption that it is difficult for the attacker to build an
AP with identical hardware information. However, building
a fingerprint library is non-trivial. Moreover, extracting the
fingerprints takes a long time, making such approaches in-
feasible when real-time is an essential requirement. Broadly
speaking, the essence of Evil Twin detection is to find the as
many differences between the rouge AP and the authentic
AP as possible.
This paper introduces a novel method for detecting Evil-
Twin APs, Our approach is based on the received signal
strength indicator (RSSI). Our approach targets Smart Home-
s and exploits the fact the position of an AP is often fixed in
a Smart Home environment. The main benefit of RSSI mea-
surement based systems is that they do not require any addi-
tional sensor/actuator infrastructure but use already avail-
able communication parameters. By using RSSI, we can
estimate the distance between the signal point and the re-
ceiving point [17–25].The work we are presenting relies only
on received signal strength measurements from wireless ra-
dio access points to determine their possible position. In S-
mart Homes, The position of each AP is fixed and the RSSI
signal is relatively stable, which is to great extent to meet
the requirements of the detection factor not easy to imitate
as previous refer. The challenge however is to identify the
rouge APs in the case of that the intensity of the rouge AP
is greater than that of the authentic AP. According to the
802.11 standard, when there are multiple APs existing n-
earby, a WLAN client will always choose the AP with the
strongest signal to connect to[14, 26, 27].
Unlike past approaches, our detection factor is not eas-
ily to imitate as the the AP’s position is stable in smart
homes. Hence, in some cases, those APs who are not at pre-
determined position may have been forged. Our experimen-
tal results show that the proposed approach can effectively
identify rouge APs. Our approach achieves on average a
successful rate of 96% with less than 20s testing delay.
The main contributions of this paper are, (1) It is first
the Evil-Twin attack detection system for Smart Homes,
(2) It is also the first to demonstrate RSSI can be used as
a means for detecting Evil-Twin Attacks in smart homes.
Although our approach assumes the location of the AP is
stable, the essential idea can be expanded to the other WIFI
environments.
2. BACKGROUD
SSID and BSSID is always used to identify WIFI hot point
since the protocol 802.11 does not define a strong sign to do
it. In fact, both of them could be easily got by attacker, be-
cause the wireless network not only share the media but also
cannot control the signal range. Although the access point
is protected by password and sophisticated encryption, for
an experienced attacker, it is not difficult to crack it dur-
ing a short time. The original 802.11 security organization
that try to solve these problems was the Wired Equivalen-
t Privacy(WEP). In spite of having mechanisms to provide
authentication, confidentiality and data integrity, WEP was
found to be unsafe and trivially cracked after an attack-
er has gathered enough frames with the same Initialization
Vector[28]. By actively accelerating the gather of frames, the
latest WEP attack has been able to complete a breaking of
WEP in under a minute[29]. WEP is increasingly being re-
placed by the Wi-Fi Protected Access(WPA). Nevertheless,
to hold backward compatibility, WPA has not totally solved
some security problems. Because control and managemen-
t frames can be tricked and faked even with WPA enabled,
wireless Local Area Networks(LANS) reserve impressionable
to identity attacks and denial of service attacks[10].Once the
attacker got the password, they will soon forge a same one
called Evil-Twin AP (Rouge AP or Fake AP), is not easier
recognized by user. Over the past few years, this kind of
attack mainly exists in some public environments such as
airports and cafes. However, as the development of the IoT,
the attack value of private WIFI rises rapidly, and the attack
develops towards the private WIFI in the Smart Home and
other environments. Once the user connects the network
to the Fake AP, the intruder can control the network envi-
ronment of the user, and further, privacy sniffing, malicious
data tampering and others advanced attack can be realized.
The behavior of the intelligent device even can be controlled,
for instance, opening or closing an intelligent lock, etc.
According to IEEE 802.11, when there is lots of AP-
s around with the terminal, one with the strongest signal
to be connected[14]. So the Fake AP is always be put at
the nearest of attack target in order to be choose. This kind
of attack can be called Fishing, which contains active Fish-
ing and passive Fishing. Passive Fishing is namely that the
Fake AP is just waiting for the connection from the termi-
nal. This kind of attack cannot easily be found since it does
not affect the Real AP, at the same time, the attack success
rate is not high. Active Fishing means that to connect with
the terminal, Fake AP cut of the connection between Real
AP and the terminal by Evil-Twin Attack. Such attack can
be carried out to precise attacks without affecting the other










Figure 1: Examples scenarios in which the attacker can eas-
ily launch an Evil-Twin attack to steal information using
a fake AP. This kind of attack typically happens when a
hacker constructs a mock (but still functional) Wi-Fi access
point (AP) right at the place where there ought to be an
original and legitimate Access Point. The reason this works
so well is that for a well-orchestrated attack, the illegiti-
mate AP has stronger signals than the legitimate one and
hence the unsuspecting users might log on to this mock-up
connection and then use the internet while sharing all their
precious data – all the way from their user IDs, passwords
to credit/debit card information.
Attack scenarios.Figure 1 illustrates the scenarios where
the Evil-Twin attack can be applied. Evil Twin are designed
to look like real Wi-Fi hotspots. In those scenarios, the ad-
versary is able to set a Fake AP to launch an Evil Twin
attack from a laptop. Its signal might be stronger to the
victim than the Real AP. Once disconnected from the le-
gitimate Real AP, the tool then force oﬄine computers and
devices to automatically re-connect to the evil twin, allowing
the hacker to intercept all the traffic to that device. When
people in Smart Homes are using the Internet through an
Evil Twin, they can unknowingly expose their passwords
and other sensitive online data to hackers. According to the
Wi-Fi Alliance, a sophisticated Evil Twin can even control
what websites appear when users access the Internet. That
allows hackers to capture their passwords.
Assumptions.Our attacks require the adversary to set
up the evil twin at a different location. We believe that
the adversary maybe not set the Fake AP very close to the
Smart Homes in order to avoid being caught. If a profile for
the legitimate AP exists, the client device will automatically
connect to the faked AP.
4. DRET OVERVIEW
DRET is a system that helps wireless home owner to dis-
cover and prevent Evil Access Points (AP) from attacking
wireless users. The application can be run in regular inter-
vals to protect your wireless network from Evil Twin attacks.
By configuring the tool you can get notifications sent to you
alarm signal whenever an evil access point is discovered. Ad-
ditionally you can configure DRET to perform DoS on the
legitimate wireless users to prevent them from connecting
to the discovered evil AP in order to give the administrator
more time to react. However, notice that the DoS will only
be performed for evil APs which have the same SSID but dif-
ferent BSSID (AP’s MAC address) or running on a different























Figure 2: The overview of DRET System.DRET mainly con-
sists of three parts (SDSP&SDMP&MDMP).
Following a common practice in FAKE AP detection, DRET
will choose different modular depending on different circum-
stances. SDSP meet the simple scenario such as during night
and when nobody is at home. However, SDSP is limited and
the success rate is closely related to the Detector location.
To addressing this limitation, SDMP is proposed, which lo-
cate the mobile phone firstly, the RSS fingerprint value is
drawn to SDSP(¶), so the SDSP can determine the loca-
tion of legitimacy(·), the result return to SDMP. Sometimes
many devices work in multi places, these devices need to use
only one set of fingerprint data to check at the same time.
MDMP will start, the RSSI is adjusted and then send to
SDMP(¸), the result done by SDMP return to MDMP(¹).
5. PRELIMINARIES
In order to construct a real environment, the attacker
will do anything to improve the Fake AP so that it has
the same features a Real AP, including traffic characteris-
tics and hardware fingerprint characteristics. However, the
attacker cannot forge the position of the Real AP. In Smart
Homes, the intuition underlying our design is that each Real
AP has its fixed position, and the attacker cannot put the
Fake AP exactly in the right place. Therefore, a new Smart
Home Fake AP detected method based on RSSI is proposed
in this paper.
Figure 3 is shown as the principle of Fake AP Detection
based on RSSI. RAP and FAP are respectively represented
Real AP and Fake AP. Detector receives the signal from each
AP. D1 is the distance between the Detector1 with the Real
AP, and D1’ is the distance between the Detector1 with the
Fake AP. If D1 is greater than D1’, it means that the inten-
sity of Detector1 received from the Fake AP is stronger than
the Real one. In general, when there exists multipath effect,
Detector always choose the strongest signal in the homolo-
gous signals. So, undoubtedly, when the attacker turn on
FAP1, Detector1 will choose it rather than the real RAP1.
But when the attacker turn off the FAP1, The Detector1
will choose RAP. According to the upper analysis, we can
easily identify the Fake AP from the Real one by comparing
the RSSI of them. In this scene, If RSSI1’ is greater than










Figure 3: The figure shows two REAL APs(in green) and
two FAKE APs(in red). The figure illustrates that the De-
tector(in black) how to recognize the FAP by using the dif-
ferences of the RSSI that the APs locate differently.
However, there is another scene that the distance between
the Real AP and detector is less than the Fake one’s. In this
condition, no matter open or shutdown the Fake AP, the
detector would always choose the Real AP. So, we should
try to build a scene like the previous one, namely, moving
the detection’s position to Derector2, making D3’ is greater
than D3, then we can detect the Fake AP.
In free space, the path loss of signal propagation express
signal attenuation, which is defined as the difference value
between the effective radiated power and the received power.
So the path loss in free space can be computed by the follow-
ing formula.Gt and Gr separately express the antenna gain
of the sender and the receiver.λ indicates the signal wave
length, d is the distance between the sender and receiver.










Frequency of WIFI channel 1∼13 is from 2.412∗109 ∼
2.472∗109. And there exists λ=c/f, c≈3∗108m/s,so the val-
ue range of λ is 0.1214 ∼0.1244. We did some experiment
to study what factors effecting the attenuation and the at-
tenuation curve is shown as the Figure 4. In Figure a, both
of the sender and receiver has unity-gain, and the channel
is 1. In Figure b, both of the sender and receiver has unity-
gain, and the channel is 13. In Figure c, the Antenna gain
product of the sender and receiver is 100, and the channel
is 13. From the Figure 4, we can find the following rules.
(1) From a and b, we can find that the effect of channel on
attenuation is very small. (2) From b and c, we can find
that antenna gain has a great influence on attenuation. (3)
From a, b and c, we can find that the distance is the main
factor to affect the attenuation, and the attenuation is less
sensitive to the distance with the increase of distance.




































































Figure 4: Signal attenuation curve
RSSI (Signal Strength Indicator Received) is the intensity
of the received signal, its value can be calculated by the
following formula:
RSSI = Transmit Power + Antenna gain - Path Loss
For a fixed transmitter and receiver, the Transmit Power
and Antenna Gain are both constant, and the Path Loss is
a function of the distance D, so RSSI can be expressed as
RSSI=f(d). Then d will be d=f’(RSSI). Therefore, RSSI can
be used directly to replace the distance for positioning.
In order to be simplify the calculation, we proposed Signal
Space and Signal Distance. Signal Distance can be abbre-
viated as sd, then sd=|RSSI|. In Figure 5, the left are the
physical space, and the right is the signal space. Both of
them take AP as the reference point. Point a, b, c, d is the
position of four mobile phones. In the physical space, the
distance separately between a, c, d are equal, less than the
distance between b and AP. But there are obstacles at the
point a and d, where the attenuation of the black obstacle is
higher than the gray obstacle, so sda>sdd>sdc, sdb>sdc. In
general, the signal strength of straight line is the best when
there is no obstacle, and wireless devices always give priority
to the best signal when dealing with multipath effects. So,
from the physical space to the signal space, the distance of















Figure 5: Physical Space convert to Signal Space
In order to verify that the RSSI can be used as the defec-
tion factor, we did an experiment. In normal circumstances,
we build a fingerprint library by using the signal distance.
Terminal MX3 is used as director to collect RSSI signal and
the TL-WR882N is used as AP. The distance between them
are 5m, and data collection rate is 2 times per second. We
collected about 14000 of the total data, keeping surrounding
environment is not changed during the process of collecting
data, except that someone walked across. Its probability
distribution histogram is shown as the following figure 6.












Figure 6: probability distribution histogram
By analyzing the experiment data, it is found that the
measured value of the actual measurement is near to a sta-
ble value, and the probability distribution is approximately
normal distribution. That means the RSSI can be used as
the defection factor.
Actually, it seems that both of the Fake and Real AP
is similar to the detector, which are difficult to be distin-
guished. According to multipath effect, the detector will
select the one with the strongest signal to associate and com-
pute the distance between the selected AP and it, which will
be compared with the distance recorded in signal distance
fingerprint database. If they are different, that means the
AP should be forged. The mobile phone will be used as the
detector. Depending on whether the mobile phone which be
used as a detector in smart home moving or not, two differ-
ent kinds of solution has been proposed in this paper, they
are: a single fixed position detection and the multi-position
collaborative detection.
6. AUTOMATED DETECTION ANALYSIS
6.1 A SINGLEFIXEDPOSITIONDETECTION
Smart homes devices still need work under networking
even there is no one at home, the detector is also. There-
fore, we install the detector in a fixed position, and let it
work 24 hours. Detector establish target AP RSSI finger-
print library in normal sense, which would be used as sample
when detecting. Only the detected distance is within the er-
ror range of distances recorded in fingerprint database, it is
considered as the fake AP, otherwise, it is true AP.
It is assumed that the deployment of hot spot and detector
as shown in Figure 7. The position of fake AP and true
AP are different, but the other features are same, such as
network card hardware features, antenna gain, stability, etc..
A, B, and C are the positions of three detectors. The signal
intensity of true AP and fake AP is the same in the position
A (shown as Y2 axis). The signal intensity of true AP is
stronger than ones of fake AP in the position B, and the
opposite in position C.
In the security state, that is, where there not exits the
fake AP, the RSSI and variance of signal intensity which
separately received by three detectors at position A, B, C is
shown in the following form.
Fake AP’s working will lead to multipath effect. There-
fore, it is assumed that PA,PB,PC is the probability of s-
electing true AP signal in A,B,C. Under ideal conditions,
0<=PC<PA=0.5<PB<=1 , and the new Average and Vari-















Table 1: FSSI and Variance in the security State
a certain range of fluctuation due to kinds of factors like the
multipath effect, the external interference and etc.. It is as-












Table 2: FSSI and Variance when fake AP is working
From figure 7, we can see that when the detector in re-
gion C, it will select Fake AP since whose signal intensity is
stronger than the Real AP’s, which can be described with
the formula like µ′>µ.When µ′>µ+M, we can say that there
exists a Fake AP in the network. When the detector in re-
gion A,µ′=µ, that means we cannot distinguish the Real AP
and the fake one. In region B, although the signal intensity
of Real AP is higher than Fake AP, but the detector consid-
ers both of them is the same signal, the latter is still cannot
be detected.
As analysis shows, detector and Real AP cannot be too
close that will lead to high misdetection rate, so the best
deployment location of detector is in region C where the
signal is weak, far away from the Real AP and near the
Fake AP.
6.2 MULTI POSITION DETECTION
Obviously, a single fixed position detection method can
only solve part of the problem. In this part, multi posi-
tion detection is proposed. Multi position detection relies
on mobile phones, with it we can convert multi position to
single fixed position detection. So, first what we need to do
is determining the position of the mobile phone. The most
well-known and high accuracy of the positioning method is
GPS, while GPS devices have been known to not work very
well indoors. In this paper, we use the WIFI signal for locat-
ing the position of mobile phone by Three point positioning
method. With the popularity of WIFI, there are almost al-

























Figure 8: Multi position Detection transformation. The fig-
ure show that any three APs could be choosed as reference
in the signal space. They are used to loacate the positions
of the MobilePhone which is a detector in Smart Homes.
As shown in Figure 8, AP1,AP2 and AP3 are three dif-
ferent APs, assuming their positions are known. O is the
mobile phone’s position. The original distance can be de-
fined as sd which represents the distance between AP and
mobile phone.sdi=|OOi|, i=1,2,3,4,5. So AP1, AP2 and AP3
can locate the position of the mobile phone in the signal s-
pace. Then we can convert the Multi position detection to
a Single fixed position detection.
There are two stages in Multi position cooperative detec-
tion: fingerprint gathering stage and detection stage. The
first stage should be done in a safe state, we collect the RSSI
information both of reference AP and target AP in many
different positions, to build a fingerprint library. In the de-
tection stage, using reference AP to locate the phone and
the fingerprint data in a single fixed position detection, the
program framework is shown in figure 8, we can locate the
mobile phone’s position by using reference AP, then using
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Figure 9: Multi position Detection framework
In Figure 9, AP0 is the target AP,AP2∼APn are the can-
didate’s reference AP, the whole process can be divided into
the following 5 steps:
Step ¶: RSSI acquisition
Step ·: Effective data selection
Step ¸: Establishment of fingerprint database
Step ¹: Mobile position determination
Step º: Validity judgment
6.2.1 RSSI Acquisition
In the experiment, the value of RSSI is collected by the
interface (IOS: Android:android.net.WIFI. * (SystemCon-
figuration/CaptiveNetwork.h) in mobile phone .
6.2.2 Effective Data Selection
Effective RSSI Values Selection
It is a challenging job to choose the right RSSI values since
the mobile phone are always moving. However the RSSI
value we need should be waved in a small range, which is
shown as the Figure 10. The data in two boxes are what we
want, the others are generated by mobile phone when it is
moving. In the condition that the distance between mobile
phone and AP is 1m and there is no interference, which
generating the data in the first box. Data in the second
box is generated in the condition that the distance between
mobile phone and AP is 4m and there are two source of
interference. The other data is generated in the condition
that someone take the mobile phone go around the house
with the speed of 1.5m/s.










Figure 10: RSSI Sequence
In the first experiment, Variance increment method is used
to judge whether the mobile phone is moving. It is assumed
that the size of sliding window is 120. When the amount of
data is less than the window, it is invalid data.
Wi = {ri−ws+1, ri−ws+2...ri−1, ri} i >= ws, ri ∈ R
R is the whole RSSI sequence, ri is the value of RSSI, ws
is the window size.
The variance can be used to measure the deviation be-
tween the RSSI data and the mean value of the window.
The variance of Wi is σi which express the data fluctuation
of Wi. The greater the data fluctuation, the greater the
variance.













Figure 11: RSSI Sequence variance
As shown in Figure 11, the window size is 120, two peaks
in the middle corresponding to the moving process, that is,
it corresponds to the parts not in that two boxes in Figure
10. However, the cause of the big variance is not necessarily
a person’s movement, the stability of the signal will also
affect it. Therefore, the slope of the variance curve is used







i− (i− 1) = σi − σi−1(3)
In Formula 3,σi is the variance of Wi,σi−1 is the variance
of Wi−1.




















Figure 12: RSSI Sequence variance
The results of improved is shown in Figure 12. When k(i)
is near to 0, it means that the original variance is stable
in a certain range, that also means the mobile phone is not
moving or moving in a small range. We set a threshold to
detect whether the mobile phone is moving. If |k(i)|<=K,
the mobile phone is considered to be stable, otherwise it
means the position of mobile phone has changed.




Effective reference AP selection
In order to improve the accuracy of multi position detec-
tion, it is needed to improve the accuracy of the location.
Because of the complexity of the wireless signal transmission
in the indoor environment, the AP signal is not stable. In
the network environment, a position can be detected more
than one AP. Therefore, Signal stability and the relevance
with target AP are the two factors in choosing AP. Relevance
here means that both the target AP and the reference AP
moving with the mobile phone, that’s why the fluctuations
of the variance between the target AP and the reference AP
should be consistent.
We use Dynamic (Time Warping DTW[30], dynamic time
warping) algorithm to calculate the distance and determine
the validity of the reference AP. DTW is a method that
calculates an optimal match between two given sequences
(e.g. time series) with certain restrictions. The sequences
are ”warped” non-linearly in the time dimension to deter-
mine a measure of their similarity independent of certain
non-linear variations in the time dimension. This sequence
alignment method is often used in time series classification.
As shown in Figure 13, picture on top calculate distance
without using dynamic time but the below one uses, it can
make calculation of the distance reaching the minimum dis-
tortion.
When selecting the effective reference AP, each AP is con-
sidered as the candidate reference AP. The large number of
its variance increment is stored and the distance between
its variance increment sequence and the target’s. After get-
ting the distance of all candidate reference APs and target












Figure 13: dynamic time warp (DTW)
APs, all candidate reference APs will be ordered by the dis-
tance. The smaller the distance, the better the effectiveness.
Therefore, four candidate reference APs with the minimum
distance will be choose as the reference APs to locate the
mobile phone’s position. In general, three points are enough
for location. In order to prevent that one of the three ref-
erence APs is failure, so we choose four reference APs from
the candidate lists.
6.2.3 Establishment of Fingerprint Database
The RSSI fingerprint Library (RSSI-MAP) is built by the
RSSI sequence generated in previous section. RSSI-MAP
is shown in Form3. RJ=(r1,J ,r2,J ...rL,J)represent the fin-
gerprint information in RSSI-MAP. J is the position where
the mobile phone is stayed for detecting. L is the number
of candidate reference APs. r is the fingerprint information
of AP, which can be described by triple like r(rssi,var,len).
Items in triple represents the average, variance and length
of RSSI sequence.








J RJ=(r1,J ,r2,J ...rL,J) R
′
J=r0,J
Table 3: structure of RSSI-MAP
6.2.4 Mobile Position Determination
RT=(r1,T ,r2,T ...rL,T ) represents RSSI fingerprinting in-
formation of the reference APs are detected at the position
T.R′T=r
′
0,T represents the RSSI fingerprinting information
of the target AP is detected by the position T.Dist(RT ,RJ)is
the distance between RT and RJ .rssii,T is the average value
of RSSI for reference AP,rssii,J is the average of the RSSI se-
quence for reference AP. j is the position where the distance
between T and one in RSSI-MAP is the shortest. When
there are more than three reference APs, we can locate the
mobile phone.




Dist(RT ,RJ) in Formula 4 depend on the number of L,
in order to reduce the effect on DistT that the number of
reference AP are different in different position. The formula







When L is greater than or equal to 3, the fingerprint of
the first three APs can be used to location by using Formula
4 and 5. When L is equal to 2, there will be more than one
position and all of them have the same distance. Then we
should choose the one who is the nearest one with the target
AP. When L is equal to 1, in order to increase the accura-
cy of the positioning, the variance is used to measuring the
similarity between position T and position J. From the pre-
vious section, the RSSI form one AP at the same position is
approximate normal distribution, that is, the RSSI sequence








In the information theory, KL[31, 32] Kullback (Leibler -
divergence) can be used to describe the difference between
two probability distributions of Q and P,DKL(P||Q) is the
information loss caused by that Q is used to fit the true dis-
tribution P. So the distance between the T and the RSSI
probability distribution can be calculated using the KL di-







So, we can get formula 8 from formula 6 and formula 7.













In the formula 8,σ1=varL,T , µ1=rssiL,T







Then, according to the distance got by formula 8, the
nearest neighbor algorithm is used to find the corresponding
position in the J RSSI-MAP.
6.2.5 Legitimacy Judgment
max(rssi)represents the maximum mean of target RSSI
at position J. It is can be easily query in RSSI-MAP when
we find the position J. rssi is the mean value being detected.
Then, there is DiffT=rssi-max(rssi).
If DistT<=M and DiffT<=0, safe and there is no fake
AP.
If DistT<=M and DiffT>0, unsafe and there exits fake
AP:
If DistT>M, fingerprint database should be updated. You
can find the details in next section.
6.2.6 Dynamic Update of Fingerprint Database
The dynamic update of RSSI fingerprint database consists
of two parts, one is the addition of the new fingerprint, and
the other is the update of the existing fingerprint.
The new fingerprint should be added is because of var-
ious reasons in the training phase of the RSSI fingerprint
database. It can’t cover all the spatial sub regions of M,
so it is necessary to improve the fingerprint database in the
later stage.
The update of the existing fingerprint is caused by envi-
ronmental changes such as survival status of reference AP,
the correlation between the candidate reference AP and the
target AP, the change of the reference AP’s position and so
on. At this point, we need to update the fingerprint infor-
mation which has already exists in the fingerprint database
in detection stage.[




Assume there are four valid candidate reference AP, they
are AP1,AP2,AP3,AP4, and the relationship or their effec-
tiveness is as the following: E1>E2>E3>E4,then there is
DistT=DistT (AP1,AP2,AP3), The corresponding position
is J.
When there is DistT>M
.
DistT3 = DistT (AP1, AP2, AP4)
DistT2 = DistT (AP1, AP3, AP4)
DistT1 = DistT (AP2, AP3, AP4)
If DistTi<=M, then we can use ri,T instead ri,J in the
RSSI-MAP to update the existing fingerprint. If DistTi>M,
then put (RT ,R
′
T ) into the RSSI-MAP. If DistTi<=M and
ri,tlen>=ri,j len, then we can use ri,T instead ri,J in the
RSSI-MAP.
7. EVALUATION IN SPD AND MPD
In order to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the AP
Evil-Twin detection method based on RSSI, we implement
a number of experiments.
7.1 Experiment and Assessment for Single Po-
sition Detection
Discussion of Sliding Window Size
The previous section shows, the size of the sliding window
affects the delay rate and false negative rate of detection.
That means, the bigger the window, the higher the delay
rate is, and the higher the false negative rate is. In order
to find a suitable value for the size of sliding window, wo
design a experiment like the following.
In order to verify the effect of window size on the delay,
we set the mean difference respectively between the fake AP
and the true RSSI is 25 and 10, that is, F-R=25 and F-
R=10.The window size in turn is: 1, 40, 80, 120, 160, 200,
240. The safety threshold value for each round of detection
is the maximum mean of RSSI in 30 minutes. There are 14
sets of experiment, each set of experiment will be done at
30 times, and the result is as showing in Figure 14. From
the left figure we can see that when the difference of mean
between true AP and fake AP is bigger, the delay rate is
smaller. When the window size is 120, the average delay



































Figure 14: Effect of window size on delay and accuracy
To verify the effect of window size on accuracy, when it
is in the condition that F-R=10, we set the windows size in
turn: 1, 40, 80, 120, 160, 200, 240. After the test program
running 10 minutes, open the fake AP and let it run for 3
minutes then close it for 3 minutes. Because it need a certain
delay that the mean value is changed from abnormal status
to normal status.
Due to the mean from abnormal status returned to normal
needs a certain delay, so every 3 minutes spent after a delay
time again wrong inspection or missed, it is assumed that
the error detection. If there is wrong or missed detecting
after delayed time, it is considered as the error status. This
experiment is done 50 times, and the result is shown in the
right of Figure 14. According to the experiment results,
when the window size is 80, 120 and 160, the accuracy is
more than 98%. If the windows size is too small or too
bigger, the accuracy is lower since the false positive rate is
higher.
Discussion of threshold value
In this experiment, we set the window size is 120 and the
F-R is 25 or 10. Assume that the threshold value is Rmax,
Rmax-2, Rmax+2, Rmax+4, Rmax+8. So there are 10 sets
of experiment. In each experiment is be done as the fol-
lowing step 50 times. After the test program running 10
minutes, open the fake AP and let it run for 3 minutes then
close it for 3 minutes. We can get the result of this ex-
periment from Figure 15, when the security threshold value
is Rmax, the accuracy is up to 96%. When the security
threshold value is Rmax+2 , the accuracy of the condition
that F-R=25 is up to 100%, and F-R=25 is 99%.
Discussion of distance
In this experiment, we set F-R=0,5,10,15,20, and the thresh-
old value is Rmax. In each experiment is be done as the
following step 50 times. After the test program running 10
minutes, open the fake AP and let it run for 3 minutes then
close it for 3 minutes. We can get the result of this experi-
ment from Figure 16. When F-R = 10, the accuracy is more
than 96%, the missing rate is less than 3%.















Figure 15: Effect of safety threshold on the accuracy of de-
tection


















Figure 16: Effect of distance on the detection results
7.2 Experiment and evaluation of multi posi-
tion cooperative detection
Validation of variance increment method
In this experiment, the window size is 120, and K is 4, then
split the RSSI sequence using Variance increment method in
the 6.2.1section. The result is shown as the Form 5. Drop-
ping out the fragment whose length is shorter than 120, then
we can get two effective RSSI sequence fragments (S 1 and
S 10), the total length is 2598, the effective fragment length
was 2605 in the original data sequence. So the accuracy is
99.7%.
Flag Range Length Range Mean
S 1 1-1422 1422 [-52,-35] -45.15
S 2 1366-1431 66 [-44, -39] -42.5
S 3 1424-1502 79 [-84, -38] -50.04
S 4 1489-1560 72 [-100,-64] -91.17
S 5 1507-1569 63 [-100,-87] -95.95
S 6 1552-1620 69 [-100,-72] -90.91
S 7 1609-1718 110 [-76, -38] -56.54
S 8 1660-1726 67 [-75, -40] -56.68
S 9 1669-1731 63 [-75, -40] -59.95
S 10 1861-2848 1168 [-90, -56] -66.37
Table 4: First time to split RSSI sequence
The validity of DTW algorithm
To verify that the DTW algorithm could be used to choose
the valid AP, we open the detecting software which could
find all the AP and getting their RSSI. Then we let the
detecting software move with the speed of 1.5m, staying at
three different locations and staying at each place for 15 min-
utes. At the end, there are 28 APs being found, including
1 target AP and 27 candidate reference AP. For each of 27
candidate reference AP, we use DTW algorithm to calculate
the distance of variance increment sequence between target
AP and it. Finally, we are successful to find four suitable
reference AP.
The validity of localization algorithm
In a room with 100 square meters, we collect a set of da-
ta per 4 square meters. So there are 25 sets of data. In
detecting stage, we stayed at every position for 5 minutes,
then moving to another position with the speed of 1.5m/s.
For the four suitable reference AP found in previous section,
there are three kinds of conditions, that is, the first 4 AP
should be considered as the reference AP, and the first 3,
the first 2, respectively calculate their Euclidean distance.
When there is only one reference AP, the accuracy of loca-
tion is 62%. When there is two reference APs, the accuracy
of location is 85%. When there is three reference APs, the
accuracy of location is 90%.
The validity of Multi position cooperative detec-
tion
We play a role of an attack, simulating a fake AP in a
notebook. And the experiment is done still in a room with
100 square meters, dividing it into 25 region. In each region,
we collect data for every 30 minutes, and use the maximum
mean of this region as the safety threshold. In detecting
stage, we stayed at every position for 5 minutes, then moving
to another position with the speed of 1.5m/s. Experiments
were carried out for 200 times, 100 times is to open the fake
AP, the other 100 times is to turn off the fake AP. When
the fake AP is turned on, if there is any position detected by
the fake AP, then the detection is successful, if all the po-
sitions are not detected by the fake AP, then the detection
fails. Close the fake AP, if there is any position to detect
the false AP, then the detection fails, if all the positions are
not detected in the fake AP, then the detection successfully.
When there is only one reference AP, the accuracy of loca-
tion is 58%. When there is two reference APs, the accuracy
of location is 80%. When there is three reference APs, the
accuracy of location is 90%.
8. RELATEDWORK
At present, most Evil-Twin detection method work for the
public WIFI environment. They are two key approaches in
this domain. One is based on hardware feature, the other is
flow feature.
The hardware feature testing method utilizes the charac-
teristic that different network card chips and different drives
possess different fingerprint features to set up a fingerprint
feature library and decide whether the Fake AP is existed
or not through matching fingerprint data in the fingerprint
feature library during testing. Bratus et al.[7] sends some
SIMULATING frames which possess false formats but are
not prohibited by a standard protocol. Although different
network card chips or drives have different responses to var-
ious SIMULATING frames, the testing method is easy to
be found by an intruder. Franklin et al.[9] characterize the
drivers during the ”active scanning period”. This method
is undefined in the IEEE 802.11 standard on the frequency
and order of sending probe requests. Therefore, each manu-
facturer employs its own algorithm. This technique is that
it cannot distinguish between two devices using the same
network card and driver. So this technique may not be used
for identifying individual devices. Loh et al.[10] fingerprint
client station, by surveying probe requests. Client station
send probe requests in the light of characteristic periodic.
The period itself is attached to slight variations. Far from
being consistent, these variations can be clustered. With
enough detection time, each cluster slowly derives, with a
slope proportional to the time skew. This work is able to
particularly identifying client station; however, the requires
more than one hour of traffic and is only application to client
stations. In a word, Franklin et al.[9] and Loh et al.[10] u-
tilize the characteristic that different wireless network cards
send different Probe Request frames with different period-
s during scanning to set up the fingerprint library. As the
equipment only sends a small number of Probe Request dur-
ing joining the network and the method can be valid when
passive scanning is used, the expensive time overhead and
the relatively bad real-time property are involved; Neuman-
n et al.[11] utilizes the arrival time of inter-frame space to
identify the wireless equipment, but the characteristic can
be faked by the intruder and the testing method based on
the characteristic can be bypassed. The testing methods
for the hardware fingerprint feature of the equipment above
mentioned cut both ways: various fake AP can be tested
effectively and the cost of faking the hardware feature of the
intruder is relatively high; but the cost of building the hard-
ware feature fingerprint library is high, the time for extract-
ing the hardware fingerprint is long, the testing real-time
property is worse, and the expansibility is bad.
According to the flow feature testing method, the network
flow feature is different when the fake AP is existent or non-
existent; so, whether Evil-Twin AP is existent or not can
be tested. The method is excellent in extendibility, but also
has some disadvantages. Beyah R et al. [12] utilizes the
arrival time space of each data packet to build a flow feature
library; as the method is influenced by flow shaping greatly,
the practical operation and the applicability is not good;
Wei W et al. [13] proposes that the arrival time of the ACK
data packet in a TCP protocol can be used to set up the flow
feature library; as the arrival time is influenced by TCP, the
testing efficiency is limited; Sheng B et al. [14–16] proposes
that data round trip time can be used to test whether the
fake AP is existent or not, but the data round trip time
is influenced by the network type, the band width and the
state of congestion at the same time.
Besides, Xu et al. [33] puts forward the wireless fake AP
attack in an in-vehicle network, meanwhile, gives the testing
method based on RSSI. The method requires that all of the
APs are equipped with GPS modules to report their own
positions; a user judges whether the fake AP is existent or
not through whether the measured RSSI is matched with
the position or not. The method can effectively test the
fake AP attack in the in-vehicle network, but is not suitable
for indoor environment because the GPS signal is weakened,
even shielded indoors.
9. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a novel approach to detect fake
APs in a smart home environment. Our approach uses RSSI
as the fingerprint of the authentic AP to detect fake APs.
We have proposed two methods to identity fake APs in two
different scenarios where the genuine AP locates on a single,
fixed or multiple positions. Our experimental results show
that our approach can detect 90% of the fake APs with little
extract overhead to the communication delay time.
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